Let us not play
with words—ever. Let us not place any bets on the homonymy, in French, between tendre
and tendre, on the relations between, on the one hand, the immense
semantic network and all the properly intentional senses of the verb tendre:
in the dominant tradition in French, it connotes rather oriented activities,
perhaps even virility (Latin, tendere, French, tendre: to tend,
to hold out, to tender, to extend, to stretch, to lay out, to set up [dresser]
, to hold out one's hand or to set up a trap and attend to it, to give or to
ensnare, to orient oneself toward, to intend to, intentionally to seek, and so
forth); and on the other hand, the instance of the attribute tendre: the
latter often connotes fragility, delicacy, a rather passive vulnerability that
is nonintentional, exposed, and rather childlike or feminine in the same
dominant tradition of its privileged figures. Thus, in extending privileges to
the caress, Levinas no doubt put the accent upon the tender of the [feminine]
Beloved. But in opening it up onto peace (an impossible peace, at any
rate-beyond the possible), he also implied the gift or offering of that which
tends or extends, or tends to hold out to the other. With the chance of
quasi-homonymy, the haunting of the tender comes back, in an essential,
irreducible, and necessary fashion, to visit the other. The other, the tender—extend
her, extend him. The proof of the tender is only in tending.
Without any
play on words, ever, it would therefore be necessary to extend an ear and
tenderly attend to these words—tender, tend, extend.
What does this
say? To extend is to offer, or give; to give what is given without giving up,
which is to say without exchange or waiting that the other returns it-or give
(him- or herself) up. Tender it. Attendant upon tender, "Tiens!" can
be heard. "Take!" Not "I give you" (a phrase made obscene
by its assumed certainty and the recognition that it seems to expect), but
"take," "receive," "accept," not from me,
precisely, since recognition is made a party to this, as is the propriety of
the proper, and economics, but "take," "accept," from whom
one doesn't know, from "God" knows whom. From "God,"
perhaps, from "God knows who."
Let us then
repeat the question: what is one doing when one is holding out to the other
something that must not come from oneself, that must not belong to who is
extending it, and saying "Tiens!" in French, and only in French, thus
in a language, which is to say something that in principle cannot be touched?
Literally, in saying "Tiens!" (as I would like to do here), one
proposes that the other touch (literally or figuratively, it's always
the same oscillation, and toucher de l'argent, "to touch
money"—payment, profit, or capital gain—is the popular idiom), that the
other grasp, or seize, or get a grip on him- or herself, but
also, in receiving and accepting it, that the other keep what one extends
to him or her. Saying "Tiens!," signifying "Tiens!" means
holding out or extending, and giving to "touch." One is suggesting that
the other take the gift of an offering for example, and receive and accept it,
and thus touch it by taking it on, by taking it in him- or herself, by keeping
it in or near oneself—as nearly as possible, in oneself or within reach of the
hand. Touch, more than sight or hearing, gives nearness, proximity—it gives
nearby. And if the two other senses, tasting and smelling, do this also, it is
no doubt because of their affinity with touching, because they partake in it or
lie near it, precisely, near the sense of nearness, proximity. In this regard,
is it ever possible to dissociate the "near," the
"proximate" [proche] from the "proper," the
"propriate" [propre]? The proximate, the proper, and the
present—the presence of the present? We can imagine all the consequences if
this were impossible. This question will no longer leave us, even if it is in
silence that we leave it to do its work. In it, the shares and dividing lines
are announced, even if they cannot always be decided....
Jacques Derrida, On Touching—Jean-Luc Nancy